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ABSTRACT 
 In response to the devastating impact of the opioid crisis, the Department of Justice 
has in recent years launched an aggressive crackdown on what it characterizes as 
“fraudulent prescribers” of controlled substances. Against this backdrop, 
physicians, prosecutors, and defense attorneys face a number of issues.  
First, there is a lingering circuit court split on the issue of whether indictments 
against physicians and other medical professionals for illegal controlled substance 
distribution must allege that the physician acted “outside the usual course of 
professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose.” I argue that acting 
without a legitimate medical purpose is an element of narcotics distribution that 
must be alleged in indictments for both constitutional and policy reasons.  
Next, there is ambiguity as to what type of conduct is considered to have no 
legitimate medical purpose, and the line between poor medical practice and criminal 
conduct is ill-defined. I argue that the statutory scheme for prosecuting physicians 
is vague and ineffective at providing guidance to doctors, juries, judges, and 
attorneys. 
Finally, there is the broader question of whether physicians should be the target of 
limited prosecutorial funds, or whether the government should instead focus on the 
pharmaceutical companies whose actions lie at the heart of the opioid crisis. This 
comment explores the legal options for holding drug companies accountable for 
their role in the crisis, and argues that these options are more effective than 
prosecutions of individual physicians.  
INTRODUCTION 
On June 28, 2018, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions2 announced “the 
                                                                                                     
2 On November 7, 2018, Jeff Sessions was forced to resign at the request of President Donald 
Trump. His post was briefly filled by then-Acting Attorney General Matthew Whitaker, a former 
federal prosecutor who touted the administration’s “law and order” approach to combating the 
opioid crisis. See Peter Baker et al., Jeff Sessions Is Forced Out as Attorney General as Trump 
Installs Loyalist, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/us/politics/sessions-resigns.html [https://perma.cc/QST3-
XJRX]; see also Acting Attorney General Matthew Whitaker Delivers Remarks to State and Local 
Law Enforcement on Efforts to Combat Violent Crime and the Opioid Crisis, Des Moines, IA 
(Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-attorney-general-matthew-whitaker-
delivers-remarks-state-and-local-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/87CU-ZCJK]. On February 
14, 2019, the Senate confirmed William Barr as Attorney General. David Shortell, William Barr 
Confirmed as Attorney General, CNN (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www-
m.cnn.com/2019/02/14/politics/william-barr-senate-confirmation-
vote/index.html?r=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F [https://perma.cc/994G-C9UA]. 
Barr is specially connected to a tough-on-crime approach to drugs—he served as Attorney 
General during the height of the George H.W. Bush administration’s war on drugs (which 
incarcerated a disproportionate amount of minorities on drug charges), and his daughter, Mary 
Daly, is the Trump administration’s Director of Opioid Enforcement and Prevention Efforts. 
Colby Itkowitz, Trump’s New Top AG Pick Would Be His Daughter’s Boss at Justice, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/12/06/william-barr-shares-
same-hard-line-views-drug-enforcement-his-daughter-who-already-works-justice-
department/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f5a679132cb8 [https://perma.cc/SF3Y-ZLX6]. Daly and 
her father appear to share similar law-and-order approaches to tackling America’s drug problem. 
Id.     
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largest health care fraud takedown operation in American history.”3  As part of this 
takedown, the Department of Justice charged “162 people—including 32 doctors—
with the illegal distribution of opioids.”4  Attorney General Sessions noted that the 
“ongoing opioid crisis . . . is the deadliest drug epidemic in American history,”5 and 
lamented that “[s]ome of our most trusted medical professionals look at their 
patients—vulnerable people suffering from addiction—and they see dollar signs.”6  
 Attorney General Sessions’s remarks reflect the Trump administration’s 
hardline law-enforcement approach to combating the opioid crisis.  A statement on 
The White House website details the administration’s “aggressive and multifaceted 
response to opioid addiction:” “[t]he Administration is bringing its tough law-and-
order approach to the drug trade” by, among other things, “cracking down on 
fraudulent prescribers.”7  This approach to the opioid crisis includes assigning 
twelve Assistant United States Attorneys to investigate opioid-related healthcare 
fraud in “opioid ‘hot-spots,’” creating a Medicare Fraud Strike Force to charge 
people, including doctors, with prescribing and distributing opioids, and “initiat[ing] 
a surge to focus on pharmacies and prescribers who are dispensing unusual or 
disproportionate amounts of drugs, intensifying the fight against prescription drug 
diversion.”8  
Statistics confirm Attorney General Sessions’s assertion that the opioid crisis 
has had a deadly and devastating effect on American lives.  Opioids kill more than 
115 people every day in America.9  In 2017, there were over 72,000 deaths related 
to drug overdoses in the United States, two-thirds of which involved opioids.10  
Drugs caused more American deaths in 2017 than guns, car crashes, or HIV/AIDS 
have ever caused in a single year.11  Americans, particularly those in the rural areas 
that have been hit hardest by the opioid epidemic, have been forced to confront this 
widespread problem, often when tragic overdoses mar their own communities and 
families.  An October 2018 poll found that rural Americans see opioid addiction as 
                                                                                                     
3 Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks Announcing National Health Care Fraud and 
Opioid Takedown, Washington, D.C. (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-announcing-
national-health-care-fraud-and [https://perma.cc/K8QM-4TCQ] [hereinafter Attorney General 
Sessions Remarks]. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 How We Will Win the War on Opioids, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/will-win-war-opioids/ [https://perma.cc/2TB5-5H37] (last 
visited November 28, 2018). 
8 Id. 
9 Opioid Overdose Crisis, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis#one 
[https://perma.cc/TZF8-FFJJ] (last updated Jan. 2019). 
10 German Lopez, 2017 Was the Worst Year Ever for Drug Overdose Deaths in America, VOX 
(Aug. 16, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/8/16/17698204/opioid-
epidemic-overdose-deaths-2017 [https://perma.cc/HA7R-WGW5] (citing Provisional Drug 
Overdose Death Counts, NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/drug-overdose-data.htm [https://perma.cc/Q8S2-3UV4] (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2018)).  
11 Id. 
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one of the biggest problems their communities face, matched only by their fears 
about the lagging rural economy.12  In the same poll, well over half of young rural 
Americans said they knew someone who has struggled with opioid addiction.13 
 While nearly everyone agrees that opioid addiction is a critical problem facing 
the country today, there appears to be a disconnect between the origins of the opioid 
crisis and the government’s approach to solving it.  Some argue that “[w]hile 
prosecutions do not necessarily reduce the number of Americans addicted to opioids, 
‘these cases are important because they push more people to seek treatment.’”14  Yet 
even the federal government acknowledges that the opioid crisis did not originate 
with doctors, but rather with “pharmaceutical companies,” who “reassured the 
medical community that patients would not become addicted to prescription opioid 
pain relievers.”15  “[H]ealthcare providers began to prescribe them at greater rates,” 
which “subsequently led to widespread diversion and misuse of these medications 
before it became clear that these medications could indeed be highly addictive.”16  
The National Institute on Drug Abuse points to a number of factors that acted in 
concert to cause the opioid crisis: “a healthcare system that sought to minimize pain 
and suffering” and which taught physicians that their patients would not become 
addicted to pain medication; “a massive flood of heroin in the 2000s from Mexico;” 
and the lacing of heroin with powerful and deadly synthetic opioids.17  America 
became all the more susceptible to opioids with “the gradual decline of economic 
power in parts of the country that were once the lifeblood of the economy.”18   
Meanwhile, there are estimated to be over twenty-five million Americans 
suffering from chronic pain in America, many of whom, for better or worse, have 
been led by the healthcare system to rely on opioids to provide needed pain relief.19  
However, as opioid addiction reaches crisis levels, people suffering from chronic 
pain have reported being rapidly tapered off of opioids or turned away altogether by 
doctors who fear prosecution for inappropriate prescribing.20  In the words of one 
Oregon doctor: “I will not treat chronic pain. Period . . . [t]here is too much risk 
involved.”21  With doctors fearful of treating patients who depend on opioids, many 
                                                                                                     
12 Joe Neel & Alison Kodjak, NPR Poll: Rural Americans Are Worried About Addiction and Jobs, 
But Remain Optimistic, NPR (Oct. 16, 2018, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2018/10/16/656900971/npr-poll-rural-americans-are-worried-about-addiction-and-jobs-but-
remain-optimis [https://perma.cc/QT7Y-XHP4]. 
13 Id. 
14 Kate Benner, Snaring Doctors and Drug Dealers, Justice Dept. Intensifies Opioid Fight, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/22/us/politics/opioids-crackdown-
sessions.html [https://perma.cc/R2SS-Y56N]. 
15 Opioid Overdose Crisis, supra note 9. 
16 Id. 
17 Krishnadev Calamur, An ‘Overprescription of Opioids’ That Led to a Crisis, THE ATLANTIC 
(June 23, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/06/opioid-epidemic/563576/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z446-SUJF]. 
18 Id. 
19 Brianna Ehley, How the Opioid Crackdown is Backfiring, POLITICO (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/08/28/how-the-opioid-crackdown-is-backfiring-752183 
[https://perma.cc/LTN7-KT5W].  
20 Id.  
21 Id. 
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patients have turned to street drugs to ease their pain–some even contemplating 
suicide.22  One patient, suffering from both the lingering, excruciating pain of a 
decades-old motorcycle crash as well as opioid-withdrawal symptoms, created a plan 
to kill himself when his doctor would no longer prescribe opioids, stating that “[his] 
pain exceeded [his] ability to handle it.”23  
 Against this complicated backdrop, there are a number of issues that add to the 
uncertainty doctors face when contemplating their potential criminal liability for 
prescribing opioids.  First, there is a lingering circuit court split in a small but crucial 
aspect of prosecuting doctors for drug distribution.  Circuit courts are divided on the 
issue of whether indictments against medical professionals for illegal controlled 
substance distribution must allege that the medical professional acted outside the 
usual course of professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose (or 
some variation on that language).  Some courts view acting without a legitimate 
medical purpose as an essential element of the crime that must be alleged in an 
indictment in order to comply with the standards of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 
while others believe that acting for a legitimate medical purpose is an exception to 
the general prohibition on controlled substance distribution that does not need to be 
negated in an indictment.  
 Next, there is great ambiguity as to what type of conduct is considered outside 
the usual course of professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose.  
Doctors have little guidance on the line between adequate care for their patients’ 
individual health needs and criminal liability for unlawful drug distribution.  While 
the Center for Disease Control and Prevention has released guidelines for prescribing 
opioids for chronic pain, these guidelines have been criticized by physicians’ groups, 
including the American Medical Association.24  The element of acting without a 
legitimate medical purpose is a question of fact that is left to the jury, which is often 
provided only a vague and circular sense of the element’s meaning and its 
distinctions from the more widely understood idea of medical malpractice.25  Critics 
have accused the government of “us[ing] legal ambiguity for tactical advantage” and 
have warned that the government “will not readily clarify lines it expects doctors to 
follow at their peril.”26 
Part I of this Comment explores the constitutional right to an indictment by a 
grand jury in felony cases, and the requirement that those indictments allege each 
element of the charged crime.  Next, it examines the statutory framework for illegal 
controlled substance distribution.  It then lays out the viewpoints of the various 
                                                                                                     
22 Id.  
23 Id.  
24 What Physicians Are Saying About the New CDC Opioid Guidelines, AMA WIRE (Mar. 16, 
2016), https://wire.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/what-physicians-are-saying-about-new-cdc-
opioid-guidelines [https://perma.cc/GV24-3QUQ]. 
25See, e.g., United States v. Volkman, 979 F.3d 377, 388 (6th Cir. 2015) (“This case is not about 
whether the defendant acted negligently or whether he committed malpractice. Rather, in order for 
you to find the defendant guilty, you must find that the government has proved to you beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant’s action was not for a legitimate medical purpose in the usual 
course of professional practice.”). 
26 Harvey Silverglate, When Treating Pain Brings a Criminal Indictment, THE WALL STREET J. 
(June 12, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-treating-pain-brings-a-criminal-indictment-
1434148923 [https://perma.cc/U66Y-GFLS]. 
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circuits that have weighed in on the issue: first  looking to those that have held that 
acting without a legitimate medical purpose is an element of the crime that must be 
charged in an indictment against a doctor, and then to those that have held that acting 
with a legitimate medical purpose is an exception that the government does not need 
to allege in an indictment.  It next examines petitions for writs of certiorari on this 
issue.  Finally, Part I argues that indictments against doctors must in fact allege that 
medical professionals accused of controlled substance distribution acted outside the 
usual course of professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose, for 
both constitutional and policy reasons. 
 Part II explores the substance of the “without a legitimate medical purpose” 
element.  It first looks to how the element has been defined, the wide latitude given 
to juries in deciding this issue, and the broad range of conduct that has fallen into 
this nebulous element.  It explores the criticism levied towards this element for being 
impossibly vague, difficult to clarify, and ineffective at providing guidance to 
doctors, juries, judges, and attorneys as to when conduct crosses the line into 
criminality.  This Part looks particularly at the element’s effect on elderly and rural 
physicians, before offering some solutions to the problems with defining this 
element.  
Finally, Part III addresses alternative means of addressing the opioid crisis.  It 
first explores the origins of the opioid crisis, namely, the pharmaceutical companies 
who encouraged doctors to prescribe opioids despite knowledge of the substantial 
risks these drugs entail, and the distributors who funneled these drugs into American 
homes despite knowing about their strong potential for misuse.  Then, it looks to the 
various strategies that have been put into place to hold these companies accountable.  
Finally, it argues that these options are more effective than prosecutions of individual 
physicians. 
I. ISSUES WITH INDICTMENTS OF DOCTORS FOR CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE DISTRIBUTION 
A. Background 
On April 12, 2018, seventy-one-year-old Dr. Joseph Olivieri was arrested in the 
Southern District of New York and charged with one conspiracy count and three 
substantive counts of controlled substance distribution.27  Federal prosecutors 
alleged that Dr. Olivieri had improperly prescribed testosterone to an undercover 
N.Y.P.D. agent who, according to the agent, had normal testosterone and simply told 
Dr. Olivieri he wanted to have larger muscles.28  On the day of his arrest, Dr. Olivieri 
appeared before a federal magistrate judge, who released the doctor on a number of 
bail conditions, including a condition that he could not prescribe any medicines or 
pharmaceuticals.29  That condition was subsequently modified to prevent Dr. Olivieri 
                                                                                                     
27 See Criminal Docket for Case 1:18-cr-00316-PAC, United States v. Olivieri (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
28 Complaint at 5, United States v. Olivieri, 1:18-cr-00316-PAC (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2018), ECF 
No. 1; Letter from Julia Gatto, Esq., to Hon. Paul A. Crotty, Olivieri, 1:18-cr-00316-PAC 
(S.D.N.Y.) (May 14, 2018), ECF No. 19. 
29 See Bail Disposition, Olivieri, 1:18-cr-00316-PAC (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2018), ECF No.5. 
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only from prescribing “controlled substances,”30 however, the damage to Dr. 
Olivieri’s practice was already done.  
Dr. Olivieri had specialized in treating predominantly gay men diagnosed with 
HIV and AIDs since the 1980s.31  Many of these men had grown to rely on him to 
refill their needed prescriptions.32  However, as a result of the criminal charges 
against him, Dr. Olivieri was quickly suspended by his employer, leaving him with 
little income or future job prospects while his patients scrambled to fill their needed 
prescriptions.33  As a result of the “dire financial straits” the loss of his employment 
put him in, the physician was forced to sell his New York home.34  
This chain of events, which left an elderly doctor who had devoted his career to 
treating HIV/AIDs victims without a home or job, all occurred after an indictment 
which failed to accuse the physician of prescribing without a legitimate medical 
purpose, and prior to any finding or plea of guilt.35  While it is clear from the 
Complaint filed on April 9, 2018 that the United States Attorney’s Office for the 
Southern District of New York believed that Dr. Olivieri had improperly prescribed 
testosterone to an undercover NYPD officer, the indictment endorsed by the grand 
jury made no mention of the fact that Dr. Olivieri was a physician, or that he was 
authorized by the Attorney General to prescribe controlled substances.36  Dr. 
Olivieri’s indictment alleged only that he “intentionally and knowingly distributed, 
dispensed, and possessed with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation 
of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1).”37  In other words, Dr. Olivieri 
was indicted, arrested, forbidden from prescribing controlled substances, and 
subsequently suspended from his job treating HIV-positive men based on an 
indictment that alleged only that he intentionally prescribed controlled substances—
an act that Dr. Olivieri was authorized to perform and which millions of physicians 
perform every day in order to supply their patients with needed medications.38   
                                                                                                     
30 See Endorsed Letter as to Joseph Olivieri addressed to Magistrate Judge Ona T. Wang from 
Julia Gatto, Esq. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Ona T. Wang on 4/18/2018), Olivieri, 1:18-cr-
00316-PAC (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2018), ECF No. 12. 
31 Letter from Julia Gatto, Esq., to Hon. Paul A. Crotty, Olivieri, supra note 28. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Letter from Julia Gatto, Esq., to Hon. Paul A. Crotty, Olivieri, 1:18-cr-00316-PAC (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 10, 2018), ECF No. 53.  
35 See Indictment of Joseph Olivieri, Olivieri, 1:18-cr-00316-PAC (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2018), ECF 
No. 13. The physician was re-indicted on August 23, 2018 in a superseding indictment that 
included the previously omitted element.  Superseding Indictment at 2, Olivieri, 1:18-cr-00316-
PAC (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2018), ECF No. 41.  
36 See Indictment of Joseph Olivieri, supra note 35; Complaint, Olivieri, 1:18-cr-00316-PAC 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2018), ECF No. 1. 
37 Indictment of Joseph Olivieri at 2, Olivieri, 1:18-cr-00316-PAC (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2018), ECF 
No. 13. 
38 In the Superseding Indictment filed on August 23, 2018, Dr. Olivieri was charged with 
substantive and conspiracy counts of prescribing additional controlled substances, including 
opioids.  Superseding Indictment at 1-8, Olivieri, 1:18-cr-00316-PAC (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2018), 
ECF No. 41.  He pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to unlawfully distribute controlled 
substances on May 2, 2019.  Transcript of Proceedings as to Joseph Olivieri re: Plea held on 
5/2/19 before Judge Paul A. Crotty, Olivieri, 1:18-cr-00316-PAC (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2019), ECF 
No. 77.  His sentencing has been postponed pending a number of serious health issues. See Letter 
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1. The Right to an Indictment by a Grand Jury 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that “[n]o 
person shall be held to answer for a[n] . . . infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury.”39  Furthermore, the Sixth Amendment requires that 
“in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation.”40  The Fifth and Sixth Amendments together 
stand for the “substantial right” of a defendant accused of a felony “to be tried only 
on charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury,”41 so as to protect 
defendants from being “convicted on the basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not 
even presented to, the grand jury which indicted him.42  Indictments meet this 
constitutional standard by “contain[ing] every element of the offense intended to be 
charged.”43  Indictment by a grand jury “serves the ‘dual function of determining if 
probable cause exists to believe that a crime has been committed and of protecting 
citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions.’”44  The Supreme Court described 
the grand jury as “a protective bulwark standing solidly between the ordinary citizen 
and an overzealous prosecutor.”45  
Federal grand jury pools, like federal trial jury pools, are made up of U.S. 
citizens over the age of eighteen living within the federal district court’s geographical 
region.46  These potential jurors are then screened to ensure they speak English, are 
mentally and physically competent, and have never been convicted of a felony.47  A 
federal grand jury is charged with making the ultimate determination that there is 
probable cause that a crime has been committed, and prosecutors can subpoena 
witnesses and documents to provide the grand jury with evidence of a crime.48  While 
in practice there is a common belief that grand juries are so influenced by prosecutors 
that “you can get a grand jury to ‘indict a ham sandwich,’” the federal grand jury still 
retains the constitutionally-granted ability to make the ultimate decision as to 
whether or not to indict an individual who is under investigation for a federal 
                                                                                                     
from Julia Gatto, Esq., to Hon. Paul A. Crotty, Olivieri, 1:18-cr-00316-PAC (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 
2019), ECF No. 105. 
39 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Grand Jury Clause applies to any crime punishable by death or 
more than one year of imprisonment. See, e.g. United States v. Coachman, 752 F.2d 685, 689 n.24 
(D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(a)(1). 
40 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
41 Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960) (emphasis added). 
42 Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 770 (1962). 
43 Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 290 (1895). 
44 Tony Onorato & Tymour Okasha, Twenty-Ninth Annual Review of Criminal 
Procedure: Introduction and Guide for Users: II. Preliminary Proceedings: Grand 
Jury, 88 GEO. L.J. 1078, 1078–79 (2000). 
45 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). 
46 Peter A. Joy, The Grand Jury’s Role in American Criminal Justice, Explained, THE 
CONVERSATION (Aug. 7, 2017), https://theconversation.com/the-grand-jurys-role-in-american-
criminal-justice-explained-82197 [https://perma.cc/J2N2-9UNQ]. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
206 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1 
felony.49 
2. The Statutory Scheme for Drug Distribution 
Street heroin dealers, physicians struggling to walk the line between adequate 
treatment and over-prescription of federally controlled substances,50 and pill-mills 
churning out thousands of illicit opioid prescriptions can all be charged under the 
same federal statute.  21 U.S.C. section 841(a)(1) states that “[e]xcept as authorized 
by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . 
. to manufacture, distribute or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, 
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.”51  However, 21 U.S.C. section 822(b) 
empowers the Attorney General to create a registration system for medical 
professionals who, once registered, are authorized to distribute controlled 
substances.52  The Attorney General regulates these medical professionals via 21 
C.F.R section 1306.04, which notes that controlled substances may only be 
prescribed “for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in 
the usual course of his professional practice.”53  In United States v. Moore, the 
governing Supreme Court case regarding the prosecution of physicians under section 
841, the Court made it clear that “registered physicians can be prosecuted under 
section 841 when their activities fall outside the usual course of professional 
practice,”54 despite the fact that “[a] strict reading of [the statutory scheme] would 
authorize a physician to prescribe drugs freely and without medical reason so long 
as the physician is registered with the Attorney General.”55  Finally, 21 U.S.C. 
section 885(a)(1) states that “[i]t shall not be necessary for the United States to 
negative any exemption or exception set forth in this subchapter in any . . . indictment 
. . . and the burden of going forward with the evidence with respect to any such 
exemption or exception shall be upon the person claiming its benefit.”56 
3. The Circuit Court Split 
Circuit courts are split as to the essential elements of controlled substance 
distribution under section 841(a)(1) when the defendant is a medical professional 
registered with the Attorney General.57  The issue dividing the circuit courts is 
whether, for defendant-physicians, distribution outside the usual course of 
                                                                                                     
49 Ben Zimmer, ‘Indict a Ham Sandwich’ Remains on the Menu for Judges, Prosecutors, WALL 
ST. J. (June 1, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/indict-a-ham-sandwich-remains-on-the-menu-
for-judges-prosecutors-1527863063 [https://perma.cc/8Y6M-CVW4]; Joy, supra note 46. 
50 21 C.F.R. § 1308 (2018). Federally controlled substances include opioids as well as many 
non-opioid medications, such as the testosterone prescribed by Dr. Olivieri. See id. 
51 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2018). 
52 21 U.S.C. § 822(b). 
53 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04. 
54 United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 124 (1975). 
55 United States v. Outler, 659 F.2d 1306, 1309 (5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981). 
56 21 U.S.C. § 885(a)(1). 
57 See United States v. Quinones, 536 F. Supp. 2d 267, 270 n.1 (E.D.N.Y 2008); see also Leonard 
B. Sand et al., 3 Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instruction 56.02 (noting that “there is a split 
in the circuits as to whether the government must allege that the defendant dispensed the drugs 
other than for a legitimate medical purpose and not in the usual course of medical practice”). 
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professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose is an element of the 
crime that must be set forth in the indictment, or whether a registered physician 
operating within the usual course of professional practice is an exception that, per 
section 885(a)(1), the government is not required to “negative” in an indictment.58 
B. Circuits Holding that Acting Without a Legitimate Medical Purpose is an 
Element 
1. The Fifth Circuit 
In United States v. Outler, the Fifth Circuit directly and expansively addressed 
the issue of whether acting without a legitimate medical purpose is an element of 
drug distribution by physicians or an exception.59  The physician in that matter 
prescribed controlled substances to undercover agents after performing minimal 
physical examinations and after the agents stated that the drugs would be used 
recreationally and sold to others.60  The indictment against the physician contained 
fifteen “virtually identical” counts which each used language similar to count one: 
That on or about October 12, 1979, in the Macon Division of the Middle District of 
Georgia, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, James E. Outler did unlawfully 
and intentionally distribute, dispense, and caused to be distributed and dispensed, a 
quantity of benzphetamine in the form of Didrex tablets, a Schedule III drug, by 
means of a prescription to Rita Bragg, in violation of 21 United States Code, Section 
841(a).61 
At trial, the jury instructions included the element of prescribing without a 
legitimate medical purpose and the prosecution introduced evidence to sufficiently 
prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt.  However, the Fifth Circuit held that 
“the lack of a legitimate medical reason is an essential element of [a physician 
prescribing drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C. section 841(a)], and therefore must be 
alleged in the indictment.”62 
 The court concluded that the lack of a legitimate medical reason was an element 
that “embodie[d] the culpability of the offense” because “[w]ithout behavior beyond 
professional practice, there is no crime.”63  While the court acknowledged the 
government’s argument that the statutory construction of the Controlled Substances 
Act seems to treat the presence of a legitimate medical purpose as an exception to 
the general prohibition from distributing controlled substances, it went on to note 
that, despite the general rule that statutory exceptions need not be alleged in an 
indictment, “in rare instances, an exception can be so necessary to a true definition 
                                                                                                     
58 Quinones, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 270, n.1. 
59 Outler was decided by Unit B of the former Fifth Circuit during the transitional period that 
occurred while dividing the former Fifth Circuit into the new Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh 
Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit has since overruled Outler, see United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 
1316 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (discussed infra), but Outler remains binding precedent in the 
Fifth Circuit. 
60 Outler, 659 F.2d at 1308. 
61 Id.  
62 Id. at 1309. 
63 Id. 
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of the offense that the elements of the crime are not fully stated without the 
exception. . . . We believe this to be the case whenever a physician is charged with 
prescribing drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).”64  Otherwise, the court noted,  
a grand jury properly could return an indictment against any doctor for prescribing 
a controlled drug, and the doctor always would have the burden at trial of proving 
the prescription was based on a legitimate medical need.  The effect of this scheme 
would be a presumption that every physician who prescribes a drug does so without 
a legitimate medical reason.  We do not believe Congress intended this result.65 
 The court finally noted that the requirement that a grand jury indictment must 
allege each element of an offense protects both the Sixth Amendment right of a 
defendant to be informed of the nature of the charges against him, and the Fifth 
Amendment right to an indictment by a grand jury in serious crimes.66  Even where 
a physician is actually aware of the fact that he is alleged to have acted without a 
legitimate medical purpose, as he almost certainly will be when he is being charged 
with controlled substance distribution, “[t]o allow . . . a subsequent guess as to what 
was in the minds of the grand jury at the time they returned the indictment would 
deprive the defendant of a basic protection which the guarantee of the intervention 
of a grand jury was designed to secure.”67 
2. The Ninth Circuit 
 In United States v. King, a defendant physician charged with distributing 
cocaine was similarly charged with conspiracy and substantive counts of controlled 
substance distribution by an indictment that failed to allege that he was a practitioner 
distributing narcotics without a legitimate medical purpose.68  The Ninth Circuit 
concluded that “lack of authorization to distribute or dispense controlled substances 
is an element of the crime,” which must be charged in the indictment, and found the 
indictment against the defendant lacking because even “[t]he most liberal reading of 
the indictment does not reflect an allegation that [the defendant] acted outside the 
scope of the medical exception.”69  The court relied on its holding in United States 
v. Black,70 where it noted that “[i]t is not ‘more likely than not’ that medical 
practitioners registered to dispense controlled substances do so illegitimately and are 
guilty of a criminal act; common experience . . . dictates precisely the opposite 
conclusion.”71 
                                                                                                     
64 Id. at 1309-1310, 1309 n.3. 
65 Id. at 1309 n.3. 
66 Id. at 1310. 
67 Id. at 1311 (quoting Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 770 (1962)). 
68 United States v. King, 587 F.2d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 1978). 
69 Id.  
70 United States v. Black, 512 F.2d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 1975). 
71 It should be noted that the Ninth Circuit has deemed an indictment acceptable when it did not 
explicitly allege absence of authorization, but did allege that a pharmacist possessed 
pseudoephedrine that he knew and had reasonable cause to believe would be used to make 
methamphetamine, reasoning that the indictment sufficiently informed the defendant that he was 
charged with criminal conduct not covered by the exception for legitimate medical use. United 
States v. Jae Gab Kim, 298 F.3d 746, 748, 750 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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3. The Fourth and Tenth Circuits 
The Fourth and Tenth Circuits have reached less expansive conclusions, and 
they have not spoken directly to the issue of what elements must be alleged in an 
indictment.  However, both have held that when a physician is charged with 
controlled substance distribution in violation of §841(a), the government must prove: 
“(1) that the defendant distributed or dispensed a controlled substance; (2) that the 
defendant acted knowingly and intentionally; and (3) that the defendant’s actions 
were not for legitimate medical purposes in the usual course of his professional 
medical practice or were beyond the bounds of medical practice.”72 
C. Circuits Holding that Acting Without a Legitimate Medical Purpose is an 
Exception that Need Not be Alleged in an Indictment 
1. The Eleventh Circuit 
In United States v. Steele, a pharmacist was indicted for dispensing controlled 
substances in violation of section 841(a).73  The indictment charged four separate 
counts, all of which were identical except for the controlled substances named in 
them. Count one read: 
That from on or about July 1, 1993, and continuously thereafter, up to and including 
on or about November 2, 1993, in the Northern District of Florida, the defendant, 
William O. Steele, did knowingly and intentionally dispense hydromorphone 
hydrochloride, a schedule II controlled substance, commonly known as Dilaudid, in 
violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1).74 
 The Eleventh Circuit, in perhaps the most firm ruling of all the circuit courts 
on this side of the issue, held that “an indictment of a practitioner for unlawfully 
dispensing drugs need not aver that it was done outside the course of professional 
practice.”75  The court looked specifically to section 855(a)(1), and, based on the 
provision’s “explicit and unambiguous” language, held that it meant that “an 
indictment charging a violation of § 841(a) need not negate the course of professional 
practice exception.”76  While the court noted the defendant’s point that “Congress 
could not have meant what it said in § 885(a)(1), because that would mean 
prosecutors could indict each and every pharmacist and doctor in the country for 
simply carrying out their professional duties,” the court wrote that they “seriously 
doubt that the Department of Justice would tolerate the continued employment of 
any prosecutor” who would indict such cases.77  “Busy government prosecutors” 
                                                                                                     
72 United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 475 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted); see 
also United States v. Varma, 691 F.2d 460, 462 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that the government 
must prove “(1) That defendant distributed a controlled substance; (2) That he acted intentionally 
or knowingly; and (3) That defendant prescribed the drug without a legitimate medical purpose 
outside the usual course of professional practice.”). 
73 United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1317 (11th Cir. 1998). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 1318-19. 
77 Id. at 1319. 
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would not want to indict cases they are certain to lose at trial, according to the court.78  
The court finally noted that Congress alone has the power to define crimes and 
defenses, and that Congress has said that the legitimate medical purpose exception 
is a defense, not an element.79  
2. The Third Circuit 
In United States v. Polan, a physician was indicted and convicted of one 
conspiracy count and thirty-one substantive counts of distributing oxycodone in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. section 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).  The physician was charged 
with writing prescriptions for individuals who he was aware would turn over the 
prescribed drugs to a co-conspirator, who subsequently would sell the drugs or barter 
them for sexual favors.80  The defendant raised a post-conviction argument that the 
indictment failed to charge an essential element of the offense of illegal drug 
distribution.81  Because the challenge to the indictment was tardy, the indictment was 
construed in favor of the government.82  
The Third Circuit relied on the 1922 Supreme Court case McKelvey v. United 
States, where the court concluded that it was 
a settled rule . . . that an indictment or other pleading founded on a general provision 
defining the elements of an offense, or of a right conferred, need not negative the 
matter of an exception made by a proviso or other distinct clause, whether in the 
same section or elsewhere, and that it is incumbent on one who relies on such an 
exception to set it up and establish it.83  
The court stated that this rule from McKelvey  was “codified” in 21 U.S.C 
section 885(a)(1).84  It then held that there are three elements to illegal drug 
distribution by a physician: “the physician must (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) 
distribute (3) a controlled substance,” and that allegations that the drug distribution 
was not authorized by the Attorney General are not required in an indictment due to 
section 885(a)(1) and McKelvey.85  
The court noted that the Ninth and Fifth Circuits did not address section 
885(a)(1), “which is clearly controlling unless its application in this situation is 
unconstitutional,” and that the arguments by those circuits were therefore 
unpersuasive.86  It addressed the Outler court’s suggestion that an exception may be 
essential enough to a crime that it becomes an element of the crime, stating that it 
was “not persuaded by this argument because essentially the same argument can be 
made with respect to every statutory exception.”87  The court held that it could not 
refuse to follow section 885(a)(1) and McKelvey “simply because it could in theory 
                                                                                                     
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 1320. 
80 United States v. Polan, 970 F.2d 1280, 1281-82 (3d Cir. 1992). 
81 Id. at 1282. 
82 Id. 
83 McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 357 (1922). 
84 Polan, 970 F.2d at 1282. 
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 1283. 
87 Id. at 1283 n.1. 
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result in abusive indictments of physicians—an eventuality that apparently has not 
occurred in the 22 years since this provision was enacted.”88 
3. The Seventh Circuit 
In United States v. Roya, the defendant-physician was convicted of twenty-four 
counts of controlled substance distribution for prescribing stimulant drugs to 
undercover agents after minimal examinations and despite the agents’ statements 
indicating that they were sharing the drugs with others.89  All counts of the indictment 
alleged that the defendant either “dispensed or . . . attempted to dispense controlled 
substances ‘pursuant to a prescription not written in the course of professional 
practice.’”90  However, the defendant-physician argued that the indictment was 
“vague, uncertain, and failed to inform him of the nature and cause of the accusations 
against him with the certainty required by law” because, among other things, “(1) it 
failed to cite the regulation, the violation of which was the essence of the charge 
against him, [and] (2) it failed to state an element of the offense which was included 
in the regulation.”91  The defendant took issue with the fact that the indictment used 
the “not written in the course of professional practice” language without citing to the 
Attorney General’s regulation containing this language, 21 C.F.R. section 
1304.04(a), and that it did not contain the “without a legitimate medical purpose” 
language also found in 21 C.F.R. section 1306.04(a).92 
The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the defendant’s characterization of the 
indictment and concluded that the indictment “clearly stated the essential elements 
of the offense and that the disputed language merely clarified the grand jury's 
position that the accused did not fit within an exemption to the charged offense.”93  
The court wrote that  
the disputed language, in our opinion, was not essential to a properly drawn 
indictment. An indictment founded on a general provision of a statute need not 
negative an exception made by a proviso or other distinct clause, whether in the 
same section or elsewhere. Addition of such language, therefore, should not render 
an indictment defective.94   
The court noted that inclusion of this language was not necessary to “properly 
charge[] this defendant, in a manner making the charge sufficiently clear to him, that 
he had dispensed in a manner not exempted under the statute.”95  According to the 
court, the indictment did not “render[] the defendant unable to prepare a defense 
adequately, to have caused him surprise at trial, or to have placed him in double 
jeopardy.”96 
                                                                                                     
88 Id. 
89 United States v. Roya, 574 F.2d 386, 388-89 (7th Cir. 1978). 
90 Id. at 390. 
91 Id. at 389-90. 
92 Id. at 390-91. 
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 391 (citing McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 357 (1922); United 
States v. DiPietroantonio, 289 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1961)).  
95 Id. at 391. 
96 Id.  
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4. The Sixth Circuit 
Finally, in United States v. Seelig, three defendant-pharmacists appealed their 
convictions for distributing Valium and codeine-based cough medicine 
Dextropropoxyphene (both opiates) in violation of section 841(a)(1).97  The 
defendants objected to the fact that the indictment failed to charge them with acting 
“not in the usual course of professional practice,” as “pharmacists are exempt from 
the criminal sanctions of section 841(a)(1) if they dispense drugs in the usual course 
of professional practice.”98  Because the indictment alleged the date, serial number, 
and issuing doctors of the prescriptions in question, the court was unconcerned by 
the possibility that the defendants might not have enough facts to avoid being 
prosecuted again for the same crime.99  In a somewhat circular opinion, the court 
held that because,  
[a]s a matter of law, a registered doctor is subject to the criminal penalties of section 
841(a)(1) if he is not acting within the usual course of professional conduct . . . the 
allegation of distribution in violation of section 841(a)(1) includes the legal 
definition that the drugs were not . . . distributed in the usual course of professional 
practice.100   
In other words, an indictment alleging illegal distribution of controlled 
substances incorporates the allegation that those substances were not distributed in 
the usual course of professional practice, even when it does not explicitly state that 
element.  
D. Petitions for Writ of Certiorari 
In many of the above cases, either the government or the individual defendant 
submitted a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court asking the Court to 
weigh in on the issue of indictments against doctors charged with illegal drug 
distribution.101  For instance, defendant William Steele petitioned the Court to review 
the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in United States v. Steele.102  The question presented 
in Steele’s petition was whether  
an indictment charging a practitioner . . . with dispensing a controlled substance in 
violation of Section 841(a)(1) of Title 21, United States Code, meet[s] the 
constitutional standards for an indictment established by the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution if it fails to allege that the defendant’s 
conduct in dispensing the controlled substance was outside the scope of professional 
practice?103   
                                                                                                     
97 United States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1980). 
98 Id. at 211. 
99 Id.  
100 Id. 
101 See generally, e.g., Polan v. United States, 513 U.S. 1050 (1994); Outler v. United States, 455 
U.S. 950 (1982); Seelig v. United States, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Roya v. United States, 439 U.S. 
857 (1978) (denying petitions for writ of certiorari). 
102 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(No. 94–3139), 1999 WL 33640050 (U.S.). 
103 Id. at *i. 
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However, despite the conflicting positions of the Circuit Courts of Appeal, the 
Supreme Court has consistently denied certiorari petitions on this issue.104 
E. The Circuit Courts that Require Indictments to Allege that Controlled Substance 
Distribution Took Place Without a Legitimate Medical Purpose and Not in the 
Usual Course of Professional Practice Take the Correct Approach 
While the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected petitions for writ of certiorari 
on the issue of indictments against doctors charged under section 841(a)(1), the 
severity of the opioid epidemic and the Department of Justice’s subsequent 
crackdown on doctors prescribing opioids makes this issue newly relevant, and at 
some point the Court may decide to finally address the issue.  Furthermore, a number 
of circuits have yet to conclusively rule on this issue, leaving little guidance for both 
federal prosecutors preparing indictments and federal district court judges ruling on 
motions to dismiss indictments for failure to state a claim.  Courts that have not yet 
addressed this issue should follow the logic of the Fifth, Ninth, Fourth, and Tenth 
Circuits, and require that indictments against physicians for violation of section 
841(a)(1) allege that the physician distributed controlled substances without a 
legitimate medical purpose and outside the usual course of professional practice.  
The circuits that have held otherwise have leaned heavily on 21 U.S.C. section 
885(a)(1) in concluding that prescription without a legitimate medical purpose need 
not be alleged in an indictment.  According to these circuits, section 885(a)(1) 
reflects the clear intention of Congress that prescription without a legitimate medical 
purpose is an exception to, not an element of, illegal drug distribution.  However, 
there are a number of issues with this reading of the statute. 
1. Congress Cannot Relieve the Government of Its Obligation to Charge Each 
Element of a Crime in an Indictment, and Section 885(a)(1) Should Not Be Read to 
Do So 
First, while  
defining criminal conduct is a task generally ‘left to the legislative branch,’ 
Congress may not manipulate the definition of a crime in a way that relieves the 
Government of its constitutional obligations to charge each element in the 
indictment, submit each element to the jury, and prove each element beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”105   
The Supreme Court has recognized that the legislature may label facts otherwise, 
but that these facts may nevertheless may be “‘traditional elements’ to which these 
safeguards were intended to apply.”106  Here, as the Fifth Circuit concluded in Outler 
(discussed supra), prescription without a medical purpose lies at the heart of the 
offense of illegal drug distribution for physicians.  Congress almost certainly cannot 
have intended to imply that the millions of medical professionals distributing 
controlled substances across the country are presumptively guilty of a federal felony 
                                                                                                     
104 See supra note 101 (listing cases denying certiorari). 
105 Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 557 (2002) (internal citations omitted), overruled on 
other grounds by Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). 
106 Id. 
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unless they prove that their prescription was legitimate in a court of law.107  While 
the Third Circuit feared that this reading of section 885(a)(1) would necessitate 
reading every statutory exception as an element, it seems plain that not all exceptions 
are as crucial to the definition of the crime as the exception for licensed doctors 
lawfully prescribing medicine.108     
Adding to the idea that acting without a legitimate medical purpose is an element 
of controlled substance distribution for physicians is the undisputed fact that “lack 
of a legitimate medical purpose” must be proved at trial beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Even within circuits holding that indictments need not allege that doctors acted 
without a legitimate medical purpose, the United States Attorney’s Office routinely 
urges judges to instruct juries that they cannot find physician-defendants guilty 
unless it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt that they acted outside the usual course 
of professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose, and judges 
routinely honor these requests.  For instance, in a case where a physician was charged 
with distribution of a controlled substance in the Middle District of Florida, which is 
located within the Eleventh Circuit, the United States Attorney’s Office asked the 
judge to instruct the jury that: 
The Defendant can be found guilty only if all the following facts are proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt: 
The Defendant distributed or dispensed the controlled substances alleged in the 
indictment; 
The Defendant did so knowingly and intentionally, that is to say, that the Defendant 
knew the substance was a controlled substance under the law; and 
The Defendant did so either for no legitimate medical purpose or outside the usual 
course of professional practice.109 
                                                                                                     
107 Controlled substances, it should be noted, range from methamphetamine and heroin to 
Robitussin and Lunesta. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 1308.11-1308.15. 
108 The Third Circuit also relies heavily on McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353 (1922), the 
holding of which the Court claims is the foundation of § 885(a)(1).  McKelvey is a 100-year-old 
case concerning an apparent band of rouge cowboys who obstructed at gunpoint a group of sheep 
farmers from moving their flock across federal public lands. 260 U.S. at 354-55.  The cowboys 
were indicted under a federal law stating that: 
no person, by force, threats, intimidation, or by any fencing or inclosing, or any other unlawful 
means, shall prevent or obstruct, or shall combine and confederate with others to prevent or 
obstruct, any person from peaceably entering upon or establishing a settlement or residence on 
any tract of public land subject to settlement or entry under the public land laws of the United 
States, or shall prevent or obstruct free passage or transit over or through the public lands: 
Provided, this section shall not be held to affect the right or title of persons, who have gone upon, 
improved or occupied said lands under the land laws of the United States, claiming title thereto, 
in good faith.  
260 U.S. at 356 (emphasis added).  This statute, carving out a narrow exception for homesteaders 
sprinkled throughout hundreds of millions of acres of federal public lands, appears patently 
different from a statute that, taking the Third Circuit’s view, would subject the over one million 
physicians practicing in the United States to a federal indictment unless they could prove that they 
were not one of a relative handful of bad actors prescribing drugs without a medical purpose. 
109 Proposed Jury Instructions at 26, United States v. Gayden¸ No. 6:16-cr-187-Orl-41TBS (M.D. 
Fla. June 4, 2018); see also, e.g., Transcript of Jury Instructions and Verdict at 27-28, United 
States v. Chapman, No. 4:11-CR-22-HLM-05 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 1, 2016) (“[T]he defendant can be 
found guilty of the offenses charged . . . only if all of the following facts are proven beyond a 
2020] DO NO HARM OR INJUSTICE TO THEM 215 
By acknowledging that acting “for no legitimate medical purpose or outside the 
usual course of professional practice” is a fact that must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the government recognizes that that fact is an element of the crime 
of controlled substance distribution for physicians.110  Because there is a 
constitutional right that all elements of a crime must be alleged in an indictment, it 
logically follows that the fact that the government itself contends is an element must 
be alleged in criminal indictments against physicians for controlled substance 
distribution. 
Judge Leonard Sand noted that a reading of section 885(a) that “shift[s] the 
burden of proving that the prescriptions were issued for a legitimate medical purpose 
to the defendant”—and which thereby makes authorized prescriptions an 
exception—“raises serious constitutional questions . . . . The most sensible and 
constitutionally acceptable way to read section 885 is simply as placing on a 
defendant physician an initial burden of production [of the fact that he is a registered 
medical practitioner].”111  In Black, the Ninth Circuit recognized that “the 
government by its own evidence established that [the defendant] was a 
‘practitioner.’”112  Almost inevitably, when a physician is charged with illegal drug 
distribution the government will produce evidence that the defendant is a medical 
professional, thereby satisfying the initial burden of production which then brings 
the “no legitimate medical purpose” element to the table.  It seems likely that section 
885(a) was not intended to make prescription without a legitimate medical purpose 
a fact that need not be alleged in an indictment, but rather, was intended to safeguard 
against a scenario where a defendant who was not known to be a physician by the 
government could claim that an indictment was improper for not alleging that the 
defendant acted without a legitimate medical purpose.113  In that case, the 
government would not be required to affirmatively “negative” the possibility that the 
defendant might be a physician registered with the Attorney General.  However, in 
the vast majority of cases against doctors, federal prosecutors are aware that the 
defendants are doctors, and therefore section 885(a)(1) is not relevant to these cases. 
2. The Premise that Prosecutors will use Section 841(a)(1) Responsibly is Flawed 
Both the Eleventh and the Third Circuits lean on the idea that even if federal 
                                                                                                     
reasonable doubt as to each count: First: That the defendant dispensed a controlled substance or 
caused a controlled substance to be dispensed as charged in the particular count of the indictment; 
Two: That the defendant acted knowingly and intentionally; and Third: That the defendant either 
acted outside the usual course of professional practice or acted without a legitimate medical 
purpose.”). 
110 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970). 
111 Sand, supra note 57, Instruction 56.18. 
112 United States v. Black, 512 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1975). 
113 See, e.g., United States v. Miranda, 494 F.2d 783, 785–87 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that 
indictment did not need to allege that defendant was not authorized to distribute heroin because 
he, unlike a registered physician, was not included within any of the statutory categories that 
would allow him to distribute controlled substances lawfully); see also Echavarria–Olarte v. 
Reno, 35 F.3d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that indictment did not need to charge that the 
defendant possessed or imported drugs “unlawfully” where “nothing in the record indicates that 
[the defendant] is a doctor or other person permitted to distribute or import cocaine”). 
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prosecutors could indict physicians across the country, they would not pursue such 
cases when there would be little chance of success.  This is all but certain, they claim, 
as “there has been no report of prosecutors running amuck” against doctors.114  There 
are two issues with this logic.  First, the Supreme Court has repeatedly warned that 
“we cannot construe a criminal statute on the assumption that the Government will 
‘use it responsibly.’”115  Where the Court has had the option between relying on “the 
Government’s discretion to protect against overzealous prosecutions” or narrowing 
its interpretation of a statute, it has concluded that “a statute . . . that can linguistically 
be interpreted to be either a meat axe or a scalpel should reasonably be taken to be 
the latter.”116 
The second problem with this line of reasoning is that prosecutors very well may 
abuse their discretion in indicting physicians.  While the Third Circuit claimed that 
no abusive indictments of physicians have been reported since the statute’s 
enactment, it does not appear that that court undertook a comprehensive study of 
physicians indicted for federal drug distribution.  Even a relatively cursory inquiry 
into physicians acquitted on federal drug charges reveals a litany of complaints of 
overzealous prosecutors indicting doctors on evidence juries did not find convincing.  
One defense attorney, whose client was acquitted of nineteen counts of unlawful 
controlled substance distribution, stated: 
We believe that the jury’s decision should send a message to the federal government 
that we cannot try to paper over the opioid crisis by scapegoating doctors who are 
simply trying to do their jobs in treating people with debilitating pain.  The 
government needs to address the real problem of addiction and treatment and leave 
our hardworking doctors alone.  Dr. Szyman worked hard to take care of his patients.  
And the government was wrong to interfere with that.  The jury’s verdict made that 
statement loud and clear.117 
 The Department of Justice, under the gaze of the Trump White House, has 
made no secret of the fact that it is zealously prosecuting physicians whom it believes 
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are improperly prescribing opioids.118  Assistant United States Attorney Bill Powell, 
after a recent conviction of a West Virginia physician for improper opioid 
distribution, stated that “[i]llegal distribution of opioids by physicians has been and 
continues to be a high priority for prosecution in this district . . . . Physicians who 
believe they can hide behind their lab coats or medical licenses, and simultaneously 
stoke the fires of the opioid epidemic and profit from it are sadly mistaken.”119  While 
in the 1990s the Third and Eleventh Circuits scoffed at the idea that prosecutors may 
abusively indict physicians, the complex reality of the opioid crisis has led 
prosecutors to aggressively pursue physicians for drug crimes.  In this new reality, it 
is evident that the protections offered by the requirement of a grand jury indictment 
are all the more necessary as a check on over-zealous prosecutors.  
3. Medical Professionals and Their Patients Are Particularly Harmed by Imprecise 
Indictments 
 “The power to indict is the power to destroy.  For the defendant, an indictment 
hurts everywhere—in the family, business, and community.  At the end of the road, 
the indictment can lead to loss of liberty and financial ruin.”120  This is particularly 
evident in the case of physicians indicted for drug distribution, as these medical 
professionals cannot make their livelihood without a medical license and the ability 
to prescribe controlled substances.  In nearly every case of a physician charged with 
improper drug distribution, the state medical board has responded after either the 
indictment or a finding of guilt by suspending or revoking the physician’s license.121  
While revoking a license post-conviction presents fewer issues, medical boards that 
suspend professional licenses after an indictment can gravely affect the lives of 
physicians and their patients while those physicians remain legally innocent.  
Physicians may also be subject to bail conditions preventing them from prescribing 
controlled substances, effectively robbing them of their ability to practice medicine 
even before the medical board steps in.  
In Dr. Olivieri’s case, for example, many of the physician’s HIV-positive 
patients, who were “dependent on him for continuity of care and the refilling of their 
needed prescriptions,” were left in the lurch when their doctor of many decades was 
suddenly stripped of his ability to provide them with medical care.122  Dr. Olivieri’s 
patients were at least lucky in that there are many other physicians in the New York 
City area.  For rural patients, however, the indictment of their physician can leave 
them scrambling to find someone to fill their needed prescriptions.  Of 378 doctors 
charged with controlled substance distribution (249 charged federally and 131 
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charged under the equivalent state laws), 121 specialized in family medicine—the 
medical practice specialty that provides the majority of care for underserved and 
rural populations.123  In rural areas, the loss of even one physician can have drastic 
consequences on wide swaths of patients.  For instance, when two rural doctors 
stopped prescribing opioids due to warnings from the Drug Enforcement Agency 
(“DEA”), roughly 230 patients were affected, several of whom committed suicide 
when they could not find another doctor who could help them ease their chronic 
pain.124  
The dramatic loss of livelihood for physicians and, even more importantly, loss 
of medical treatment for underserved communities, should be avoided whenever 
possible.  Ensuring that indictments against physicians properly allege that those 
physicians acted without a legitimate medical purpose does not simply satisfy an 
abstract (albeit important) constitutional requirement.  Rather, it ensures that patients 
are not deprived of their medical provider unless a grand jury determines that there 
is probable cause to believe that the provider acted without a legitimate medical 
purpose.  
4. Most Physicians Indicted for Controlled Substance Distribution Plead Guilty, 
and Guilty Pleas are Particularly Burdensome for Licensed Medical Professionals 
Out of roughly 268 doctors investigated by the DEA and ultimately found guilty 
of either a federal or state crimes between 2003 and 2017, 222 pled guilty or no 
contest, while only 46 were convicted by a jury.125  While this number is actually 
somewhat lower than the overall percentage of state and federal crimes that result in 
plea bargains,126 the vast majority of physicians do not have the facts of their case 
decided by juries that finds them guilty of each element of their alleged crimes. 
Because most physicians indicted for controlled substance distribution, 
including opioid distribution, do not make it to a jury trial, it is even more vital that 
each element a prosecutor is required to prove at trial be alleged in an indictment 
against a physician.  Otherwise, a real possibility exists that a physician could be 
indicted for controlled substance distribution and choose strategically to plead guilty 
to avoid jail time—even in cases where a grand jury has not found probable cause to 
believe the physician acted without a legitimate medical purpose. 
Guilty pleas are particularly burdensome for physicians because, as noted above, 
medical boards nearly always respond to a finding of a physician’s guilt by revoking 
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or suspending the physician’s license.127  Physicians facing an indictment for 
controlled substance distribution may face the choice between going to trial and 
risking jail time or pleading guilty to receive a favorable sentence but losing their 
livelihood in the process.  Because an indictment against a physician can trigger an 
array of consequences for the physician without the facts ever reaching a jury, it is 
crucial that a grand jury find that there is probable cause to believe the physician 
acted without a legitimate medical purpose.   
II.  ISSUES WITH THE “WITHOUT A LEGITIMATE MEDICAL PURPOSE” ELEMENT 
A. How the Element is Defined 
Despite the split in authority surrounding the issue of whether the prescription 
without a legitimate medical purpose and outside the usual course of professional 
practice (the “without a legitimate medical purpose element”) must be alleged in an 
indictment, there is little controversy over the fact that  
once evidence is presented that the defendant was a medical practitioner duly 
registered to dispense controlled substances, as will be in virtually every case in 
which a physician is prosecuted under section 841(a), the government must shoulder 
its normal burden of proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt.128  
Therefore, even in circuits where the without a legitimate medical purpose 
element is not required to be alleged in an indictment, the jury must be instructed 
that “the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt [] that the defendant 
prescribed (or dispensed) the drug other than for a legitimate medical purpose and 
not in the usual course of medical practice.”129  However, this element has proven to 
be murky and difficult to define, making it equally difficult to defend against. 
“‘[P]rofessional practice’ . . . refers to generally accepted medical practice.”130  
“The term ‘professional practice’ implies at least that there exists a reputable group 
of people in the medical profession who agree that a given approach to prescribing 
controlled substances is consistent with legitimate medical treatment.”131  Courts 
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have allowed the Government to call expert witnesses to testify as to the standard of 
care for physicians, including the standards outlined in the American Medical 
Association’s (“AMA”) guidelines, in order to help define this element, noting that 
“violation of the ethical norms and regulations may be relevant to aid the jury in 
understanding what constitutes a legitimate medical purpose in the usual course of 
professional practice.”132   
However, mere medical malpractice is not enough to convict:   
A violation of the standard of care alone is insufficient to support the criminal 
conviction of a licensed practitioner under § 841(a) . . . the district court must ensure 
that the benchmark for criminal liability is the higher showing that the practitioner 
intentionally has distributed controlled substances for no legitimate medical purpose 
and outside the usual course of professional practice.133   
Merely negligent prescriptions are insufficient for criminal liability.  However, 
“[u]nder the guise of treatment a physician cannot sell drugs to a dealer nor distribute 
drugs intended to cater to cravings of an addict . . . . Congress did not intend for 
doctors to create drug ‘pushers.’”134 
B. Criticism of the Element 
The line between a physician acting negligently but within the scope of 
professional practice and a “drug pusher” may strike a reader as unclear and circular.  
Doctors and defense attorneys typically agree.  In 2015, prominent criminal defense 
attorney Harvey Silverglate penned an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal criticizing 
the element as “far from clear,” and calling for legislators and prosecutors to either 
“clarify the currently indecipherable line between treating pain and unlawfully 
feeding drug addicts’ habits, or get out of the business of policing and terrorizing 
physicians.”135  Silverglate claimed that “the government uses legal ambiguity for 
tactical advantage and will not readily clarify the lines it expects doctors to follow at 
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their peril . . . . Drug warriors collect the scalps of doctors whom they accuse of 
violating the laws; they have no concern in aiding the relief of patients’ suffering.”136 
Silverglate was particularly concerned with the lack of federal guidance on 
narcotic administration.  In 2004, the DEA released a pamphlet somewhat clarifying 
“the line between legitimate medical practice and criminal over-prescription.”137  
However, the DEA withdrew that guidance less than two months later (timed, 
perhaps suspiciously, with the federal prosecution of a pain physician in Virginia), 
leaving doctors with “no official guidance about how much OxyContin [an opioid] 
is enough to relieve their patients’ pain, and how much could land them in prison.”138 
Since Silverglate’s op-ed was published, there has been some effort to clarify 
the federal line between legitimate opioid prescription and criminal over-
prescription.  The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) issued its 
first national guidelines regarding opioid prescriptions in 2016, which addressed “1) 
when to initiate or continue opioids for chronic pain; 2) opioid selection, dosage, 
duration, follow-up, and discontinuation; and 3) assessing risk and addressing harms 
of opioid use.”139  However, while these guidelines were purportedly developed with 
“input from experts, stakeholders, the public, peer reviewers, and a federally 
chartered advisory committee,”140 they have received significant criticism. 
The most notable criticism of the guidelines has been from the AMA—the very 
group that federal prosecutors often look to in defining the contours of generally 
accepted professional practice for physicians.  In November 2018, the AMA adopted 
a number of resolutions criticizing the CDC guidelines, particularly its guidance as 
to the maximum recommended opioid dose.141  The AMA resolved that “some 
patients with acute or chronic pain can benefit from taking opioids at greater dosages 
than recommended by the CDC Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for chronic pain 
and that such care may be medically necessary and appropriate,” and further resolved 
that the guidelines should not be used 
as anything more than guidance, and physicians should not be subject to professional 
discipline, loss of board certification, loss of clinical privileges, criminal 
prosecution, civil liability, or other penalties or practice limitations solely for 
prescribing opioids at a quantitative level above the MME thresholds found in the 
CDC Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids.142   
At an AMA meeting in November 2018, Barbara McAneny, MD, the president 
of the AMA, recounted a story of a patient to whom she prescribed opioids in order 
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to combat the pain of metastatic prostate cancer, and who was denied by a pharmacy 
that relied on the CDC guidelines.143  The man attempted suicide three days later, 
McAneny recounted, noting that “[m]y patient suffered, in part, because of the 
crackdown on opioids.”144  
C. Difficulties with Clarifying the Element 
Given the debate within the medical community as to the standard of care for 
opioid prescriptions, the without a legitimate medical purpose element seems nearly 
impossible to define, much less to disprove.  Some courts have sought to clarify this 
standard by:  
[G]lean[ing] from reported cases certain recurring concomitance of condemned 
behavior, examples of which include the following:  
(1) An inordinately large quantity of controlled substances was prescribed.  
(2) Large numbers of prescriptions were issued.  
(3) No physical examination was given.  
(4) The physician warned the patient to fill prescriptions at different drug 
stores.  
(5) The physician issued prescriptions to a patient known to be delivering the 
drugs to others.   
(6) The physician prescribed controlled drugs at intervals inconsistent with 
legitimate medical treatment.   
(7) The physician involved used street slang rather than medical terminology 
for the drugs prescribed.  
(8) There was no logical relationship between the drugs prescribed and 
treatment of the condition allegedly existing.  
(9) The physician wrote more than one prescription on occasions in order to 
spread them out.145 
 However, courts have also noted that these factors are “not an exclusive and 
exhaustive list of the types of conduct by which a physician can breach the limits of 
legitimate medical practice” and that they do not “establish some minimum number 
of types of conduct that must be present to permit submission to the jury of the 
legitimate medical practice issue.”146  Those courts have faulted defendants for 
attempting to take a “mechanistic approach” to the element.147  Furthermore, this list 
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comes from a compilation of cases where defendants were tried and convicted of the 
same vague law that the list seeks to clarify. 
 As it stands, juries are told that defendants must have acted more than 
negligently in prescribing medications, to the point where no reputable group of 
physicians would find that the prescription had a legitimate medical purpose.  
However, when it comes to opioid prescriptions, there appears to be little consensus 
as to what constitutes a legitimate medical purpose.  The CDC has promulgated 
guidelines for opioid prescriptions, but these guidelines have been criticized by the 
AMA.  Meanwhile courts have allowed the government to present expert witnesses 
to testify as to the standards governing medical practices, despite the fact that a 
violation of professional standards alone is, at least in theory, not enough to impose 
criminal liability on doctors.  And, while courts have attempted to provide examples 
of the type of conduct that is outside the course of professional practice, physicians 
are warned that these examples are not exhaustive.  Against this backdrop, 
Silverglate’s fear that the vague standard for acting without a legitimate medical 
purpose “puts physicians in great legal jeopardy, and too often leaves their patients 
to suffer needlessly” appears to remain well-founded.148 
D. Effect on Elderly and Rural Physicians 
 These vague standards are particularly harmful for older or rural physicians, 
who are often overburdened with patients and not up to speed on the latest in medical 
ethics and best practices.  Of the 378 physicians charged with controlled substance 
distribution under federal law or equivalent state laws between 2006 and 2016, over 
forty percent were over the age of sixty.149  These physicians, who admittedly may 
not follow best practices in prescribing controlled substances, may end up convicted 
of a federal felony for what is ultimately poor, but non-criminal, medical judgment.  
For instance, Dr. Joel A. Sabean, a 69-year-old dermatologist from Falmouth, Maine, 
was convicted and sentenced to two years in prison for, among other charges, drug 
distribution for other than legitimate medical purposes.150  Dr. Sabean was convicted 
after writing prescriptions for the schedule IV controlled substances Ambien, 
Lunesta, and Xanax for his daughter, who lived in Florida, while Dr. Sabean 
remained in Maine.151  Dr. Sabean did not dispute that he prescribed his daughter 
these medications, or that he knew that they were controlled substances.152  However, 
he argued at trial and on appeal that treatment of family members by physicians did 
not rise to drug distribution without a legitimate medical purpose.153  
 In a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of the government’s medical 
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expert, Dr. Sabean noted that the Maine Board of Licensure in Medicine’s 
regulations did not prohibit him from treating family members or prescribing them 
controlled substances.154  He argued that allowing the expert to testify as to the 
American Medical Associations Code of Ethics, which state that a physician may not 
treat family members except in emergency situations, had “the strong potential to 
confuse the jury as to the mens rea required in this case.  Because the danger of such 
confusion substantially outweighs the probative value of a description of such 
standards, testimony as to such standards [must be] excluded.”155 
 Dr. Sabean did not prevail on his motion in limine to exclude the expert opinion 
regarding the AMA ethical guidelines.156  On appeal, the First Circuit, in upholding 
the lower court ruling, noted that: 
There is no pat formula describing what proof is required to ground a finding that a 
defendant acted outside the usual course of professional practice. Rather, inquiring 
courts must approach the issue on a case-by-case basis and sift the evidence in a 
given case to determine whether a specific set of facts will support a guilty verdict. 
In conducting this tamisage, testimony from a medical or pharmacological expert 
may be helpful—but such expert testimony is not a sine qua non to a finding of guilt. 
Jurors, of course, may draw on their everyday experience, and they can be expected 
to have some familiarity with how doctors care for patients. It follows, we think, 
that jurors may infer bad faith from conduct that is commonly understood to be 
plainly unprofessional.157 
 While not specifically an opioid crime, the path that led to Dr. Sabean’s 
conviction is indicative of the perils faced by physicians prescribing controlled 
substances, especially when they are older and rural.  Dr. Sabean’s conviction for 
acts which, while inadvisable, are at best ethically suspect,158 rested in the hands of 
jurors who were tasked with drawing on their own non-professional perceptions 
about how doctors should act.  While jurors are advised that the standard for 
prescription without a legitimate purpose is higher than a malpractice standard, they 
are given little guidance as to what that higher standard might be.  Meanwhile, Dr. 
Sabean was incarcerated for two years, his medical practice shuttered and employees 
let go, and his patients were left without the benefit of an experienced and respected 
physician whom some of them had seen for over thirty years.159 
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E. Solutions 
The “without a medical purpose” element as it stands is difficult for both 
physicians and juries to comprehend.  One means of clarifying the element would be 
to administratively codify the opioid guidelines published by the CDC, and to set 
similar guidelines with regard to other controlled substances.  While the AMA has 
criticized the CDC opioid guidelines for setting the maximum opioid dosage levels 
too low for some patients with chronic pain, physicians would have the security of a 
bright-line rule which clearly states the threshold for criminal liability.  
Alternatively, Congress could draft legislation that removes physicians from the 
scope of section 841(a) by creating a separate criminal statute tailored specifically to 
physicians who overprescribe controlled substances.  As it stands, a clunky statutory 
mechanism prohibits everyone, including physicians, from distributing controlled 
substances, and then exempts those physicians from criminal liability when they 
register with the Attorney General and distribute the substances for a legitimate 
medical purpose.  Congress could instead pass legislation which affirmatively states 
that registered physicians are authorized to distribute controlled substances, while 
also setting out a set of specific instances where distribution is prohibited–such as 
when a certain dosage or number of prescriptions are prescribed or when the 
physician knowingly prescribes controlled substances to a patient known to abuse or 
sell the substances. 
Investigating, indicting, and convicting a physician for controlled substance 
distribution presents a number of highly scientific considerations that make 
prosecuting physicians distinct from prosecuting civilians.  While currently judges 
and juries are tasked with deciding when distribution of controlled substances by a 
physician is without a legitimate medical purpose, Congress is the body that is best 
equipped to study and hear testimony on technical medical issues.  
Finally, federal prosecutors could move away from prosecuting individual 
physicians and simply instruct the DEA to inform state medical licensing boards 
about suspicious or problematic prescribing practices by doctors.  Medical licensing 
boards have the power to suspend or revoke physicians’ medical licenses, which 
ultimately can have the effect of removing a doctor who is overprescribing opioids 
from medical practice without subjecting these physicians to the loss of liberty that 
typically results from a federal criminal conviction or guilty plea. 
III. ALTERNATIVES TO PROSECUTING PHYSICIANS UNDER SECTION 841(A) AS A 
MEANS OF ADDRESSING THE OPIOID CRISIS 
 
 While criminal prosecutions of physicians can be improved, ultimately, 
prosecuting physicians is not the most effective means of targeting the root causes 
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of the opioid epidemic.  Even without the specter of criminal prosecution, physicians 
who overprescribe controlled substances face the much lower bar that is required for 
state medical boards to revoke their professional licenses and deprive them of their 
abilities to practice medicine and make a living, as well as the (theoretically) lower 
bar of civil medical malpractice suits by the families of victims of over prescription.  
While often prosecutors target individual physicians, the massive corporations at the 
root of the opioid crisis are a better target for the legal system. 
A. The Origins of the Opioid Crisis 
OxyContin, the drug at the heart of the opioid crisis, was first approved by the 
Food and Drug Administration in 1995.160  The drug was developed by Purdue 
Frederick, a pharmaceutical company owned by a trio of wealthy brothers—
Mortimer, Raymond, and Arthur Sackler.161  Purdue Pharma, the marketing arm of 
Purdue Frederick, stated from the outset that “the risk of addiction when taking an 
opioid is one-half of 1 percent.”162  
The idea that OxyContin, a synthetic derivative of opium, could have a low risk 
of addiction was at odds with history.  Opium and its derivatives, including morphine 
and heroin, had been known sources of addiction for centuries.163  After the Civil 
War, roughly a hundred thousand veterans became addicted to the morphine that 
doctors routinely prescribed to treat their injuries.164  At the end of the nineteenth 
century, heroin, which is twice as powerful as morphine, and initially believed to be 
nonaddictive, was discovered and soon sold all over the world, lacing everything 
from cough drops to baby-soothing syrups.165  Within a decade, however, heroin’s 
devastating addictive qualities were recognized, and by 1924, manufacturing it was 
officially illegal in the United States.166  
Despite the history of opiate addiction in the United States, in the mid-1990s 
prescribing OxyContin was marketed as “the moral, responsible, and compassionate 
thing to do—and not just for dying people . . . but also for folks with moderate back 
injuries, wisdom-tooth surgery, bronchitis, and temporomandibular joint 
disorder.”167  OxyContin hit the market just as the medical community began to treat 
pain as a vital sign in need of greater focus and treatment, and Purdue seized on this 
mindset in their marketing schemes.168  One Virginia emergency medicine doctor 
stated that, in response to the newfound focus on pain scales and pain relief, “[e]very 
single physician I knew at the time was told to be much more serious about making 
pain a priority . . . . All it did was drive up our opioid prescribing without really 
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understanding the consequences of what we were doing.”169  
Purdue realized early on that OxyContin was most successful in small, rural 
towns.170  It purchased data to figure out which physicians prescribed the most of 
their competitors’ drugs, and sent representatives to pitch OxyContin and its alleged 
safe and potent pain relief.171  Representatives were known to gift doctors lunches, 
dinners, golf outings, and numerous branded products in order to promote 
OxyContin.172  Often, these were “impressionable young doctors, fresh meat with a 
lifetime of prescribing ahead.”173  By 2001, sales-rep bonuses topped forty billion 
dollars (up from one million dollars in 1996).174  Representatives routinely handed 
out “starter coupons” giving patients free thirty-day supplies of OxyContin, and 
Purdue Pharma paid for over five thousand doctors, nurses, and pharmacists to attend 
pain management conferences in resorts from Florida to Arizona during the first five 
years of the drug’s existence.175  All this as opioid-related overdoses, robberies, 
violent crimes, and deaths were already beginning to skyrocket in rural communities 
from Virginia to Maine, as well as in large cities and suburbs across the East Coast, 
Deep South, and Southwest.176  
Purdue claimed that it was unaware of OxyContin’s potential for abuse until 
2000. However, as early as 1995, when it submitted its New Drug Application with 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), it was clear that the company knew of the 
drug’s dark downsides; that the drug could be crushed up and snorted, leading to its 
immediate (instead of controlled) release; that, when liquified and injected, sixty-
eight percent of the drug was recoverable; and that in patient trials, several patients 
had experienced symptoms of withdrawal.177  Despite these findings, the FDA 
allowed Purdue to market OxyContin’s long-acting formulation as “believed to 
reduce” its addictive nature.178  In 1998, a study and accompanying editorial 
published in The Journal of the Canadian Medical Association found that, in reality, 
drug users and dealers “coveted” long-acting opioids like OxyContin.179  While 
Purdue knew of this study, it did not disclose it to the FDA or to its sales reps, whom 
the company continued to use to push their narrative of the drug’s non-addictive 
nature.180  By 2001, when the addictive nature of OxyContin had become more 
widely known, Richard Sackler—the son of Raymond Sackler and the then-president 
of Purdue Pharma—wrote an email advising that the company push the blame onto 
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the very consumers who had unwittingly become addicted to his company’s drug, 
stating that “[w]e have to hammer on abusers in every way possible. . . . They are 
the culprits and the problem. They are reckless criminals.”181  Even in 2007, when 
Purdue Pharma had already entered into one settlement with the Justice Department 
and attorneys general in other states were suing, Purdue continued to push 
OxyContin onto veterans and the elderly, downplaying the risks of addiction.182  
Drug distributors—who distribute and track medications from warehouses to 
healthcare providers—also played a heavy role in the opioid crisis.183  Distributors 
such as Cardinal Health, McKesson, AmerisourceBergen, and Rochester Drug Co-
Operative have been alleged to have shipped oxycodone to pharmacies despite 
knowing that the prescriptions were suspicious.184 Despite being legally required to 
monitor suspicious opioid orders, the three largest distributors are alleged to not have 
had any meaningful programs in place for the first decade of the opioid crisis.185 
B. Legal Strategies for Holding Pharmaceutical Companies Responsible 
To date, there have been numerous legal battles designed to hold Purdue Pharma 
and other opioid companies accountable for their role in the opioid crisis.  Many of 
these battles remain ongoing.  Because of their potential to gain monetary funds for 
opioid treatment, their insight into the roots of the opioid crisis, and the control they 
offer the federal government over opioid manufacturers and distributors, these 
options are more productive than criminal charges levied against individual 
physicians. 
1. Federal Multidistrict Litigation 
 Over 1500 cases brought on behalf of cities, counties, tribes, hospitals, third-
party payers, and individuals against roughly thirty defendants—including opioid 
manufacturers such as Purdue Pharma and Cardinal Health and retailers like CVS—
were consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation and assigned to 
Judge Dan Aaron Polster of the Northern District of Ohio in January of 2018.  
Initially, Judge Polster stated that he hoped to see the cases settled within a year, 
declaring that “[w]e don’t need briefs and we don’t need trials.”186  However, Judge 
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Polster later changed course, and a bellwether trial for three consolidated lawsuits 
was set to take place in October of 2019.187  Hours before opening arguments were 
scheduled to begin, however, the two Ohio counties and four drug companies set to 
battle in that trial announced that they had reached a $260-million settlement.188  The 
settlement is likely to play a major role in determining the resolution of the many 
remaining lawsuits and may lay the groundwork for a global settlement.189 
2. State Attorney General Lawsuits 
The multidistrict litigation is only one aspect of the legal troubles facing opioid 
manufacturers and distributors.  Attorneys general in many states have chosen to file 
their own independent lawsuits rather than join the consolidated cases pending in 
Ohio, and in total there are over three-hundred pending opioid-related cases in state 
courts.190  On March 26, 2019, the State of Oklahoma reached a $270-million 
settlement with Purdue Pharma and the Sackler family in a lawsuit over their role in 
the opioid crisis.191  In Massachusetts, the Attorney General filed a similar lawsuit 
against Purdue and the Sacklers, alleging that the company continued to market 
OxyContin aggressively despite knowing of rising overdose deaths.192  Purdue and 
the Sacklers are not the only defendants in state lawsuits, which target a wide range 
of manufacturers, distributors, and individuals.193 
3. Federal Criminal Charges  
Until recently, the Justice Department has focused on criminal investigations of 
physicians, online drug networks, and illicit foreign opioid manufacturers, rather 
than on the manufacturers and distributors in the U.S. that created the opioid crisis.194  
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In 2007, after a four-year investigation by the Justice Department discovered 
evidence that “Purdue Pharma knew about ‘significant’ abuse of OxyContin in the 
first years after the drug’s introduction in 1996 and concealed that information,” 
federal prosecutors recommended felony indictments for three Purdue Pharma top 
executives on charges including conspiracy to defraud the United States.195  
However, top Justice Department officials instead reached a settlement with Purdue 
and its executives in which the company paid approximately $600 million in fines 
and three of its top executives pleaded guilty to criminal “misbranding” violations 
and agreed to pay thirty-four million dollars in fines.196  
Since the 2007 settlement, there have been few federal cases against opioid 
manufacturers or distributors.  However, the tide appears to be shifting, as federal 
prosecutors appear to be increasing their efforts against drug manufacturers and 
distributors.  In May 2019, five executives of Insys Therapuetics, Inc. were convicted 
of federal racketeering charges by a Boston federal jury.197  The United States 
Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts successfully alleged that founder 
and former Chief Executive Officer John Kapoor bribed doctors to prescribe high 
doses of Subsys—an opioid that is one hundred times stronger than morphine and 
highly addictive—to patients who did not need it.198  Insys then had employees call 
insurance companies while pretending to be from doctors’ offices, fabricating 
diagnoses in order to get coverage for the Subsys prescriptions.199  At trial, jurors 
were shown internal spreadsheets that Insys made to track the amount of money it 
paid to each doctor and the amount the company made from each doctor’s 
prescriptions.200 
Moreover, on April 23, 2019, the Justice Department announced that the United 
States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York had brought federal 
criminal charges against Rochester Drug Co-Operative (“RDC”), which is one of the 
ten largest drug distributors in the country, as well as two of the RDC’s former 
officers.201  The charges included unlawful distribution of oxycodone and fentanyl 
as well as conspiracy to defraud the DEA, and the Government also brought a civil 
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suit against RDC for their failure to report suspicious controlled substance orders to 
the DEA.202   
Although the charges levied against RDC were severe, the Government also 
announced that it had reached an agreement with RDC “under which RDC agreed to 
accept responsibility for its conduct by making admissions and stipulating to the 
accuracy of an extensive Statement of Facts, pay a 20 million dollar penalty, reform 
and enhance its Controlled Substances Act compliance program, and submit to 
supervision by an independent monitor.”203 The government agreed that if RDC 
remained in compliance with the agreement, it would defer prosecution for five years 
and then dismiss the charges.204  
The two former RDC officials, William Pietruszewski and Laurence F. Doud 
III, were charged with illegal narcotics distribution in violation of 21 U.S.C. section 
841(a)(1), as well as conspiracy to defraud the United States.205  Mr. Pietruszewski 
was also charged with failure to file suspicious order reports with the DEA.206  The 
charges against Mr. Doud remain pending, while Mr. Pietruszewski pled guilty to 
the charges against him, pursuant to a cooperation agreement.207 
C. Why, Despite Their Limits, These Options Offer Greater Benefits than 
Prosecuting Individual Physicians 
Litigation against drug manufacturers and distributors, alone, will not solve 
America’s opioid epidemic.  However, particularly in contrast with prosecuting 
doctors, there are far greater benefits to pursuing both civil and criminal litigation 
against drug manufacturers and distributors than against individual physicians.  
Litigation against drug companies has the potential to bring about large-scale change 
in the current treatment of opioid users and in the future of drug approval, marketing, 
and regulation. 
The first and most obvious benefit of going after drug companies is money.  In 
many of the cases noted above, pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors have 
reached massive settlements with both state governments and the federal 
government.  For instance, in Oklahoma, over $100 million of the state’s $270 
million settlement with Purdue is earmarked for a new addiction treatment and 
research center at Oklahoma State University in Tulsa.208  Opioid litigation has the 
potential to be on par with the Big Tobacco litigation of the 1990s, which resulted in 
the largest civil litigation settlement agreement in U.S. history.209  While plaintiffs 
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involved in litigation against opioid manufacturers face the additional legal burden 
of proving that the drugs, which were FDA approved, were used as directed and still 
caused harm, they also have the benefit of decades of improvement in health records 
and pharmacy records, as well as the precedent set by the Big Tobacco litigation.210  
Like the Master Settlement Agreement reached by the states and the Big Tobacco 
companies, and like the settlement agreement reached in Oklahoma, litigation 
against pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors could ultimately result in 
those companies footing the bill for large-scale opioid addiction cessation treatment, 
research, and awareness.211 
Criminal and civil litigation against pharmaceutical companies also give the 
public far greater insight into the root causes of the opioid epidemic.  Barry Meier, 
who has covered the opioid epidemic for the New York Times for seventeen years, 
noted that a downside to settling cases with opioid companies is that lawsuits are 
often ended quickly, before discovery has a chance to truly develop, and that even 
when information regarding companies’ knowledge of the addictive nature of 
opioids is discovered, it is often subject to confidentiality agreements reached as part 
of the settlements.212  If cases against opioid companies go to trial, however, 
important information about the history of the opioid epidemic could be revealed, 
which could impact the future of how governments approve and regulate drugs, as 
well as how companies test, market, and sell them.213 
Civil and criminal actions against pharmaceutical companies by the government 
can also allow for greater government control over specific companies that have 
acted wrongly.  While the federal government already has extensive regulatory 
control over drug companies, agreements between the government and drug 
companies that come about as a result of lawsuits can bring bad actor companies 
under even greater scrutiny.  For instance, the recently deferred prosecution 
agreement between the government and Rochester Drug Co-Operative, requiring 
reform and expansion of the company’s Controlled Substances Act compliance 
program and independent supervision, is just one example of how prosecuting drug 
companies can give the federal government tighter control over companies that are 
known to have harmed the public with addictive and dangerous drugs. 
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CONCLUSION 
 America’s opioid epidemic is complex and challenging, and it will not be 
overcome by any one policy or strategy.  Experts recommend a number of 
intertwined strategies to combat this disease of despair, including stricter prescribing 
measures; expansion of alternative treatment for current sufferers of chronic pain 
who rely on opioids; expanded addiction treatment; needle exchange programs and 
supervised injection sites; increased access to naloxone; and, perhaps most 
fundamentally, changes to the way communities address physical, emotional, 
economic, and social well-being.214  Litigation in any form can only look backward 
in an attempt to hold wrongful parties responsible and gain knowledge from past 
missteps.  
 The prosecution of physicians is simply one small piece of the complicated 
puzzle that is the opioid crisis.  It may seem that clarifying the means by which 
doctors are prosecuted is an academic exercise in the face of a real and critical 
epidemic.  However, the circuit split on the elements required to be alleged in 
indictments against doctors, as well as the larger issues with defining the without a 
legitimate medical purpose element, have real ramifications not only on physicians, 
but on communities who depend on doctors for needed healthcare.  Congress and the 
courts should take care to clarify and redefine the type of conduct that rises to 
criminality among physicians, who often struggle to walk the line between providing 
compassionate medical care and overprescribing dangerous drugs.  Moreover, state 
and federal governments who seek to hold people and entities responsible for the 
opioid crisis should look beyond individual medical practitioners, and instead focus 
on the drug companies and their executives whose direct and knowledgeable actions 
brought this epidemic into being.  Holding the proper parties responsible for the 
opioid crisis is one of many steps the government can take in helping the nation to 
heal.  
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